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with actions which they were admonished to correct. I think a much subtler use
of misogynistic lore was at work in these sermons, one tinged with the "can't
win" rhetoric of woman's inherently flawed nature, but always at the same
time holding out the possibility of Christian purity, creating in the devout
hearer a powerful blend of guilt, personal responsibility, and striving for
grace. That blend would provide a far better basis for social control than a flat
definition of woman as "supervenient" and it would, therefore, provide a
better rationale than Bloch's for the material and institutional practices which
denied certain social powers to women.
A similarly ingenious logic denigrates clothing and language (as
clothing), and links woman with both, and especially with figurative language.
The observation that woman is figure will not lead to the serene denigration of
womanhood Bloch sees in medieval discourse, because from the time of On
Christian Doctrine and after the figure was taken as God's preferred way of
speaking to man--non-literal, perhaps, but persuasive and beautiful, sometimes
linked with the Incarnation. That woman is rhetoric is similarly two-sided;
rarely is the efficacy of rhetoric called inherently evil; like other words and
coverings, rhetoric receives praise when "decent and comely" (as the English
Reformation controversies put the matter). When it all adds up to women
being like literature in their unredeemability, we see a rich and many-sided
controversy about the moral status of both reduced to an ahistorical monotony
which characterizes neither.

Marshall Leicester
English, Cowell College, Univ. of California, Santa Cruz
Here's a proper subject for the legion of feminist men: let them
undertake the analysis that can tell us why men like porn.
(B. Ruby Rich, "Anti-Porn: Soft Issue, Hard World," Feminist Review 13
(1983), 66.)
Surely Howard Bloch would agree that he is, to use his word, in a
citational relation to the texts of misogyny, that is, that he is quoting and
respeaking and paraphrasing them with the understanding that he does not
agree with what they say, though he does purport to-represent correctly what is
said. What I wonder about is the source and character of the pleasure that
speaks in his citing, and the way it spills over into his own style. What interests
me is the impish chopping of logic, and the savoring of paradox and the
outrageous, whether they are thought of as Augustine's and Tertullian's or as
Bloch's, though neither he nor they quite owns up to them. If I think of this
pleasure as Tertullian's, I find myself wanting to know the institutional setting
and the reception of the impudence that is at work in the passages from him
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Bloch cites, which Bloch doesn't credit, though it is close to his own. A
characterization like "Tertullian, of course, does not seek...to wrestle with the
supervenient status of his own thought upon the superficial" (13) seems less an
analysis of whatever medieval misogyny might be than a doubling of the
ideological logic produced by a certain way of reading these texts, a way of
reading that creates a voice for them that will allow Bloch to patronize them in
the way they patronize women. If, as Bloch pretty conclusively demonstrates,
no one can speak misogyny because its contradictions undo it, one wonders if
this impossibility is really as unapparent to the texts themselves as he assumes. I
think Bloch could tell us a lot, if he would, about the pleasure that comes in
forcing an outrageously perverse perspective, the pleasure, for instance, of
insisting on the least complex understanding of the most extreme of positions,
the enjoyment of quoting/creating/playing--"citing--a voice like the one
ascribed to Tertullian, and then generalizing it. What is the character of the
fun, for Tertullian, of producing an account of woman so improbable on the
face of it? Is it allied to the fun of producing an account of something as
aggressively partial and patently unlikely on the face of it as what is here called
the Middle Ages, "medieval thought," or medieval misogyny? What I hear in
this text, whether I call it medieval misogyny or Tertullian or Howard Bloch,
is a witty and complicated speaker enjoying driving a conspicuously perverse
argument as far as he can. That pleasure is not related in any simple way to the
argument's "truth," which may well be perverse. I see that this speaker,
whoever he is, believes something about this argument (he is not simply in bad
faith), but I also see that he thinks that it is important to maintain what he calls a
citational relation to it, to sustain his irony. That is not only because it may be
important politically to sustain his distance from the content of what he quotes,
but also because it seems important to keep open the question of his precise
commitment to the argument for pleasure's sake: the enjoyment of the
impossible purity of the stance is partly dependent on stipulating its
impossibility.
Indeed, who speaks? I do not think it can be accidental that when such a
speaker wishes to write about medieval misogyny he is drawn to Tertullian,
unless of course such a speaker is what is produced, no matter who does it, by
the project of writing Tertullian as the ideal type of medieval misogyny. In any
case, my question, which is real because I don't know the answer to it, has to
do not only with the nature of the pleasure that speaks here, but with its gender,
if it has one. Does the gender system Bloch delineates describe it? Is his
pleasure "feminine" in those terms? Is Tertullian's? If Christine de Pizan is
being sarcastic in the passage cited in note 13, is hers?
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